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SKILLED IMMIGRATION AND WAGES IN AUSTRALIA 
 
1. Introduction     
 
Almost 200 million people are living in a country different from their place of birth. 
Australia is one of the world’s major host nations for immigrants. One out of every 
four people currently living in Australia was born abroad. These immigrants have 
made important contributions to the country’s economic performance and 
development. However, supports for immigration, and its appropriate magnitude, 
are matters of continuing public debate. One prominent issue sustaining the 
debate is the widespread concern in host countries that immigration harms the 
labour market prospects of native-born workers. That concern is not restricted to 
Australia but lies at the heart of the debate about immigration in many countries - 
including most European nations, the U.S and Canada (Scheve and Slaughter 
2001). Accordingly, better understanding of the Australian experience may prove 
useful in clarifying the issues elsewhere. 
 
The domestic labour market implications of immigration have been investigated 
intensively. Prominent issues include immigrant assimilation (Baker and Benjamin 
1994a; Borjas 1995), labour market participation and unemployment (Altonji and 
Card 1991; Cobb-Clark 2003), employment and wages (Card 1990, 2001), 
language and earnings (Chiswick and Miller 1995; Dustmann, and Francesca 
2003), welfare participation (Baker and Benjamin 1994b; Hansen and Lofstrom 
2003), immigration and economic welfare (Clarke and Ng 1993). The usefulness 
and explanatory power of such aggregative investigations, i.e., investigations 
which treat immigrants as a homogeneous factor, are circumscribed by the fact 
that immigrant flows are intrinsically heterogeneous. Migrants differ by gender, 
culture and language, education and training, vocational skill and in terms of 
many other attributes. These characteristics may influence the direction of their 
entry into the labour market of the host country, their performance in the various 
submarkets, and also the wage and employment consequences for relevant 
groups of native workers. In recognition of that heterogeneity, the empirical 
immigration literature has concentrated increasingly on the composition of 
immigrant flows and on their differential effects on the host country. For instance, 
Borjas (2003, 2006) examines the implications of immigrant skill level on the labour 
market prospects of native workers. The growing interest and applied work in this 
general area has been heavily oriented towards the U.S. and, more recently, 
Canada and the European Union.  
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The main immigrant-receiving countries in the world have continued to record 
positive net in-migration flows (Figure 1A). While family (re)unification flows 
constitute a significant component of immigrant flows into the U.S, the immigration 
programs of Australia and Canada are increasingly focused on migrant skill as 
reflected in the points system adopted by both countries.1 The criteria for 
awarding points steer the skill composition of immigrant flows to accommodate 
the demand in Australia for particular occupational skills, outsourcing talents or 
business skills. The skill visa category is also the main avenue by which overseas 
students gain permanent residence in Australia.  
 
Australia witnessed a large inflow of skilled migrants in recent years. Between 2000 
and 2006, the total immigrant intake by Australia was about 140 thousand per 
year. Skilled migration accounted for approximately 65 percent of the migration 
visas to Australia granted in 2004-05, with approximately one third of these 
accruing to foreign students (Productivity Commission 2006). The trend towards 
increasing skilled immigration is also noticeable in Canada and New Zealand 
(Table 1A).  
 
While skilled immigration may not erode the overall employment prospects of the 
native labour force, it may well affect the relative position of skilled workers. Any 
changes in that relative position, i.e., changes in the wage differential between 
skilled and unskilled labour, are likely to be dominated by changes in the wages of 
skilled workers. Unskilled wages are relatively unresponsive to market forces and, 
hence, to immigration by virtue of the minimum wage setting practice in Australia 
that relies on union-negotiated increases. Skilled wages are not so restricted, and 
typically respond to changing labour market situations. Hence, native skilled 
workers are potentially more exposed to competition from skilled migrants than 
are native unskilled workers. It follows that skill-oriented immigration policy like 
Australia’s may influence not only domestic wage levels but also the domestic 
wage structure. Given the relative inertia of unskilled wages, it is plausible to 
hypothesize that changes in average domestic wages reflect comparable 
movements in the wages of skilled workers and, hence, in the skilled-unskilled 
wage differential.  
 
Empirical work on the differential effect of skilled and unskilled migration on 
domestic wages is quite recent. Investigations of aggregate employment and 
labour market outcomes for Australian-born workers dispel the popular notion that 
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immigration reduces domestic real wages. For instance, Addison and Worswick 
(2002), examining cross-sectional Australian data for 1982-1996, do not find that 
disaggregating the native labour force by skill group changes their findings for the 
aggregate labour force. Chang (2004) shows that immigration cannot explain the 
variation in the skilled-unskilled wage differential in Australia during the 1990s. 
Parasnis, Fausten and Smyth (2005) find that an increase in the proportion of 
immigrants in the domestic workforce has a significant positive effect on labour 
market outcomes for native workers.  
 
The vast empirical literature for the U.S. suggests, in general, that employment 
effects of immigration are negligible while there may be some negative wage 
effects of recent immigrants. Exploring the role of skill in U.S. immigration, Borjas 
(2003) finds that an immigrant influx that increases the size of a particular skill 
group by ten percent reduces the wages of native workers in that group by about 
three to four percent. He corroborates this finding in a subsequent examination of 
US high-skill labour markets. For example, Borjas (2006) finds that foreign students 
studying in the US reduce expected ear n i n g s  o n  d o m e s t i c  s t u d e n t s  b y  3 - 4 % .  
Growth of the number of foreign-born students in a particular doctoral field at a 
particular time had significant and adverse effects on the earnings of doctorates 
in that field who graduated at roughly the same time. Symmetric labour market 
outcomes are observed in response to unskilled migration. Card (1990, 2001, 2005), 
on the other hand, finds no such negative effects. Using data on occupation and 
metropolitan area to define the relevant labour markets, Card (2001a) observes a 
slight adverse impact of an immigration-induced supply increase. Card (2005) 
reviews the recent evidence on U.S immigration and concludes that there is scant 
overall evidence that immigrants have adversely affected natives’ labour market 
outcomes. He also finds that immigration-induced changes in the skill composition 
have little effect on wages. 
 
Similarly, Friedberg (2001) observes that immigration has little impact on the wage 
structure in Israel after correcting for endogeneity of occupational choice. 
Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston (2005) find no strong evidence that immigration 
affects aggregate employment or wage rates in the U.K. The evidence for 
Germany is mixed. De New and Zimmermann (1994) identify detrimental effects 
while Pischke and Velling (1997) find no such effect of migration on employment. It 
appears that empirical evidence of negative effects of immigration is typically 
generated by aggregate factor proportions analysis or nation-wide approaches 
(Borjas). Studies based on local labour markets or on “natural experiments” such as 
political developments in sending countries (Card) find no significant effect of 
immigration on outcomes for natives. Studies exploiting geographic variation by 4 
 
correlating immigration with changes in native outcomes across cities or regions 
find less sizable effects (Altonji and Card 1991) or no effect at all (Pischke and 
Velling 1997). 
 
Most previous studies of the wage effects of immigration use cross-section data. 
There is a limited time series literature that examines the co-integration and 
causality patterns between immigration and unemployment. Some studies explore 
the short-run and long-run relationship (Islam 2007a) or causality analysis (Withers 
and Pope 1985) between immigration and job market prospects. A few cross-
section studies find mixed evidence on the effect of immigration within skill groups 
(Card 2001; Friedberg 2001; Borjas 2003). Cohen and Tai-Hsieh (2000) use time 
series data for Israel and find that immigration-induced changes in wages are 
reversed eventually. Islam (2007a), also using time series, detects a long-run 
positive relationship between the immigration rate and real wages in Canada. 
 
Thus, the popular preconception that immigrants threaten the wage and 
employment prospects of native workers finds no robust support in the empirical 
literature on aggregate migration flows or on disaggregated flows. But the 
presumption persists nonetheless. Empirical estimates using a variety of 
approaches in a variety of settings have mostly shown that the effects of 
immigration on labour market outcomes are either very small or that they yield 
conflicting results. This inconclusive state warrants more work. The most interesting 
time span for analysis is the long run which affords sufficient time for the 
adjustment of wages and aggregate demand. The weak correlation between 
wages and immigration suggests that trends in relative wages associated with 
inflows of migrants should be investigated by time series analysis (Borjas, Freeman 
and Katz 1996, 1997; Borjas 2003). Accordingly, the present paper employs time 
series analysis to explore the impact of skilled immigration on wages in Australia. A 
complete analysis of the trends of the relevant identifying characteristics of the 
various cohorts of immigrants is beyond the scope of the present paper. At the 
same time, we provide an empirical strategy that recognizes immigrant 
heterogeneity but does not require the use of complete aggregate data (see 
section 3). 
 
A major problem in studying the impact of immigration is that the choice of host 
country may be endogenous. Immigrants may self-select to join labour markets in 
those industrial countries which are booming  (Friedberg and Hunt 1995). In 
addition, host countries may base their target immigration rates on a 
predetermined immigration policy or domestic labour market conditions. We 
address this potential problem of endogeneity by exploiting the fact that 5 
 
Australia’s immigration policy and previous labour market outcomes may serve as 
the basis for the immigrants’ choice to seek admission to the Australian labour 
market. Using different variants of the instrumental variable (IV) methods we first 
estimate the effect of immigration on Australian wages. Because we are using 
macordata on immigration flow we also need to deal with possible small sample 
bias problem due to the limited span of time. So we check the robustness of the IV 
results with Jackknife Instrumental Variable Estimation (JIVE) (Angrist, Imbens and 
Krueger 1999; Blomquist and Dahlberg 1999), and validate the choice of 
instruments by different tests for the validity and specification of the instruments. 
We use quarterly time series data covering the period 1980-2006. The start of the 
observation period is fixed by the earliest date for which data for different skill 
categories of immigrants is available for Australia.2 Our fundamental result is that 
neither skilled nor unskilled immigration exerts discernible adverse effects on 
wages in the Australian labour market. In fact, our evidence suggests that 
immigration may exert positive effects on wages.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Analytical approaches to modeling 
the impact of immigration on labour market outcomes are reviewed in the next 
section. Sections 3 & 4 delineate the empirical strategy and specification of our 
model, and describe the data, respectively. Section 5 presents the estimation 
results, followed by robustness checks of the results in section 6. Concluding 
remarks are given in section 7. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
 
The effects of immigration on labour market outcomes can be examined from 
alternative analytical perspectives such as area analysis, Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) 
trade model, production theory approach (PTA) and factor proportion analysis 
(FPA). Area analysis (e.g., Card 1990; Altonji and Card 1991; Lalonde and Topel 
1997) exploits the high concentration of immigrants in gateway cities or states, 
assuming that labour markets in host countries are geographically segmented. 
Each local market has its own equilibrium wage structure determined by local 
labour market conditions. On the other hand, the HO model focuses on trade as 
an indirect source of supply of particular skills. The factor price adjustments 
induced by trade flows affect different skill groups and labour market participants 
differentially, including migrants and indigenous workers. The PTA (Grossman, 1982; 
Borjas 1987a; Card 2001; Islam 2007b) distinguishes between immigrant and native 
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early 1970s. 6 
 
workers, and treats both kinds of labour along with other factors of production as 
separate inputs into the production process. This analytical perspective directs 
attention to the substitution possibilities between immigrants and other factors of 
production, including native labour. The FPA (Borjas, Freeman and Katz 1996, 1997, 
Borjas 2003) emphasises skill groups rather than national origin of labour, 
considering immigrants an exogenous source of labour supply. This approach 
focuses on the wage adjustments that are necessitated by immigration-induced 
labour supply shocks. Given independent information about labour demand 
elasticities, it determines the wage consequences of immigration.  
 
We adopt a macroeconomic perspective in studying immigration by focusing on 
the national labour market. However, we also use an analytical framework that 
combines elements of the production theory approach (PTA) and factor 
proportions analysis (FPA). We therefore circumvent the problems that arise from 
inter-city migration of natives as a result of the geographical concentration of 
immigration flows in certain areas or cities.  
 
An inflow of skilled labour, χετερισ παριβυσ, puts downward pressure on wages of 
skilled workers. But skilled immigration may also cause the labour demand curve to 
shift out in response to aggregate demand effects. Native workers who are 
complementary with immigrant labour could experience a rise in wages or 
employment. Unskilled workers’ wages may go up or down depending on the 
substitution possibilities between the two types of labour and the scale effect of 
immigration. In the typical textbook case, immigrants and natives are assumed to 
be perfect substitutes with little or no change in relative demand. The return to 
owners of capital may increase if, for example, labour and capital are the only 
two factors of production and labour of the same quality flows into the country. In 
this case immigrants compete directly with the native-born, exerting downward 
pressure on wages and raising returns to owners of capital. Lastly, if skilled workers 
are close substitutes for capital then inflows of skilled immigrants can result in 
higher national wages by increasing the productivity of unskilled labour. Similarly, 
assume that capital and either type of labour are complements, while the two 
types of labour are imperfect substitutes. An increase in skilled labour will then (1) 
reduce the skilled-unskilled wage differential due to scale effects (outward shift of 
skilled labour supply); (2) increase the skilled-unskilled wage differential due to 
substitution effect. The net effect is ambiguous - depending on which effect 
dominates.  
Consider adding dynamics to these comparative-static considerations in the 
setting of a Solow-type growth model with a constant saving rate, or in a Ramsey-
Casss-Koopman-type model with an endogenous saving rate. A permanent inflow 7 
 
of labour reduces the per capita endowment of capital, increasing the marginal 
productivity per capita of capital in the host country. In the steady state, where 
immigrants are endowed with higher levels of embodied human capital 
compared to the average native, the physical per capita capital stock, output 
and consumption of the total population may increase. 
 
Now assume that wages of unskilled workers are fixed above the equilibrium level, 
say by trade unions or for political reasons, for that matter. In that situation, inflows 
of skilled workers may reduce employment of native skilled workers and depress 
their wages. The ultimate result depends on wage setting practices. In the most 
extreme case, employment does not respond at all. Alternatively, employment of 
skilled workers increases as the inflow if skilled immigrants depress their wages. In 
this case, employment of native skilled workers may decline depending on their 
reservation wage level. However, if employers had been paying efficiency wages 
then it is possible that the adjustment will involve only a decrease in the skilled 
wage without any change in the aggregate employment level. In these cases 
welfare of native workers falls since there is an absolute decline in the wage level 
of skilled workers. 
 
There are, however, scenarios where skilled migrants exert only a small and 
possibly positive effect on native wages. For instance, if migrants’ spending 
patterns generate an increase in the relative output that utilizes skilled workers 
relatively intensively, then the immigration-induced change in output mix 
dissipates the downward pressure on skilled wages. Similarly, if there is an increase 
in skill-biased technological change in the host country, or if skilled immigrants are 
not close substitutes for skilled natives, then there is little reason to expect changes 
in the relative wage among native workers. Since workers with different levels of 
education perform different tasks and fill different roles in production, the majority 
of the native born workers can benefit from immigration.  
 
The inflow of workers with a unique array of skills also introduces a new set of 
opportunities for companies and investors in the host country. A large 
augmentation of domestic labour supply increases the productivity of the existing 
capital stock, inducing new investment in response to higher returns. A relatively 
large inflow of highly skilled immigrants such as scientists, engineers, or medical 
practitioners also offers potentially significant dynamic gains for creative, 
innovative and complex professions. Technological and scientific innovation 
promotes economic growth by enhancing the productivity of workers. The effect 
of innovation on productivity, however, accrues over time and is fully realized only 
in the long run. Many skilled immigrants also bring capital to the economy and 8 
 
engage in setting up firms and promote job creation. They also bring 
entrepreneurial skill and often create business linkages with their country of origin. 
These dynamic adjustments are likely to benefit labour. Lastly, from the 
perspective of the stylized Heckscher-Ohlin model, immigration cannot change 
relative factor rewards by changing the mix of factor supplies in a small open 
economy since factor prices depend on the prices of traded goods and not on 
d o m e s t i c  f a c t o r  e n d o w m e n t s .  A n  i n f l u x  o f  l a b o u r  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  a b s o r b e d  b y  
changing the direction and average factor intensity of production (Rybczynski-
effect).3 Thus, as long as immigration is not sufficiently large to change the pattern 
of specialisation or the labour intensity of production, relative wages in the host 
country will not deteriorate. 
 
Even though they may not affect wage determination immediately it is worth 
noting that new skilled immigrants are typically relatively young and that they 
become readily involved in the job market. They contribute to the host economy 
by paying taxes while claiming relatively little income support from the social 
security system.4 This fact has prompted observers to note that promotion of skilled 
immigration is emerging as an increasingly prominent element of strategies to 
protect the solvency of social security systems in potential host countries (Angrist 
and Kugler 2003).  
 
In short, immigration affects a host country in varied and complex ways.5 
Comparative static wage adjustments are merely a one-off realignment that may 
well be dominated by longer-term dynamic adjustments.  But even the net effect 
of immigration on the host country’s labour market outcomes is difficult to 
determine  α πριορι. The relationship between wages, employment and 
immigration is likely to vary across countries according to regulatory provisions and 
institutional arrangements such as employment laws, replacement laws, wage-
setting, labour market flexibility, industrial structure and business entry costs (Angrist 
and Kugler 2003). These are matters for empirical investigation and resolution. 
                                                 
3 The direction of production changes to decrease imports of labour intensive goods, 
reduce exports of capital-intensive goods and shift the output-mix towards labour-intensive 
goods. 
4 For example, Baker and Benjamin (1994b) find those immigrants’ participation rates in 
Canada’s unemployment insurance and social assistance schemes are lower than the 
Canadian-born population. 
5 Immigrants’ children, i.e., second generation immigrants, are a growing fraction of the 
Australian population. They are likely to spend their entire lives in Australia and will pay 
taxes and receive income support payments. These intergenerational consequences 
constitute important components of the long-run costs and benefits of immigration. Card 
(2005) finds that second generation children will catch up with the children of natives. They 
also have above average levels of educational attainment, even for children whose 
fathers had much lower schooling than native-born fathers. 9 
 
Cross-country evidence indicates that the ultimate effects of immigration are 
strongly influenced by the flexibility of the labour market of the host country. 
Differences across host countries in the immigrants they receive and in the 
structure of their labour markets means that the impact of immigration on any 
particular country, Australia in the present context, must be analysed on the basis 
of Australian data rather than being inferred from findings obtained for other 
countries.6 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
Assume firm output is produced by two types of workers, immigrants and native 
born (e.g., Borjas 1987a, Islam 2007b), then we can present a functional form of 
the production function as:7 
 
(1)                                                                                                            ) / ( t t P I f W =  
 
where I is the stock of immigrants in the Australian labour market, P is the entire 
domestic workforce, and Wt is the wage at time τ. (I/P)t is the immigrant share at 
time  τ, and the dependent variable is the average weekly wage of workers. 
Ideally, we would like to specify the wages of natives as the dependent variable 
but data limitations restrict us to aggregate wages (representing the composite 
average wage of immigrants and natives). Similar specifications are used e.g., by 
Altonji and Card (1991), Butcher and Card (1991), Pischke and Velling (1997) to 
compare aggregate labour market outcomes with differing immigration rates. 
Equation (1) can be interpreted as approximating the first-order condition 
determining the level of wages or as a general reduced-form relationship 
between the domestic wage level and the immigrant share. 
 
Estimation of equation (1) raises potential omitted variable problems, imparting an 
upward bias to parameter estimates. One obvious omission is a term depicting the 
                                                 
6 According to the Productivity Commission (2006), by 2024-25, annual income per capita 
would be about 0.6 per cent higher than it would otherwise have been without skilled 
migration into Australia. 
7 For example, Borjas (1987a) and Islam (2007b) consider the generalized Leontief 
production function of the form 
2 / 1 ) ( (.) j i
ji
ij L L f ∑∑ = γ  where  the production function φ(.) is 
linearly homogenous and possesses the standard neoclassical properties, and Li  is  the 
amount of labour input from the ιτη c a t e g o r y  o f  l a b o u r .  I f  f i r m s  i n  t h e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  
operate in a perfectly competitive industry then we get the following system of labour 
demand functions: 
2 / 1 ) ( i j
j i
ij ii i R R W ∑ + =
≠
γ γ  where Wi is the wage rate and Ri is the proportion of 
the ιτη category of worker (such as immigrant) in the total labour force. For more details 
see Islam (2007b). See also Grossman (1982) and Card (2001a) for similar analyses based 
on translog and CES-type production functions, respectively. 
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state of the labour market. The unemployment rate is typically captured by 
invoking some variant of the Phillips curve, efficiency wage models or bargaining 
models of wages. Higher unemployment rates weaken the bargaining position of 
employees and reduce the rate of wage increase. The Philips curve has been the 
dominant approach to modelling wage determination as it immediately reflects 
the influence of the long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment on a fixed growth 
path. This pins down the equilibrium level of labour utilization in the economy 
without recourse to any other behavioural equation. We can then estimate the 
relationship between wages and immigration using the following equation 
(2)                                                                       ) / (   3 2 1 0 t t t t X U P I W ξ α α α α + + + + =  
 
where we also add vector X  which captures the observable time invariant 
determinants of wages (such as state of residence of immigrants and average 
age of different cohort of immigrants). Ut  is the unemployment rate,  t ξ  is the 
innovation error and  0 α is a fixed effect that captures effects other than those 
associated directly with the variables in the model. It may include some 
unobservable policy shift parameters that are not reflected explicitly in the model. 
 
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest a positive association between 
wages and productivity. In a perfectly competitive market, the wage rate is 
determined by the productivity of the marginal worker. Hence, an increase in the 
labour force due to immigration should affect the wage. We need, therefore, to 
include a variable that can capture the time-varying productivity in the 
determination of the aggregate trend of wages. Productivity can be defined as 
output per man-hour at time τ. We don’t know exactly what drives productivity. It 
can be due to workers working harder or to workers becoming more skilled. At the 
level of the plant or firm, improvements in labour productivity may come from 
using better quality of cooperating inputs such as raw materials or capital, or they 
may reflect technological change. Any one of these drivers could cause this 
increase, and usually more than one factor will be involved. Inclusion of the 
productivity measure also controls for the capacity of the host country (Australia) 
to harness her human and physical resources. We, therefore, model productivity 
(προδt is the level of labour productivity at time t) as exogenous in our wage 
determination system (equation 2a) 
 
(2a)                                            ) / (   4 3 2 1 0 t t t t t prod X U P I W ε α α α α α + × + + + + =  
 




(3)                                                    ) / (   3 2 1 t t t t t prod U P I W ε β β β Δ + Δ × + Δ + Δ = Δ  
 
where  t prod Δ  is the growth in labour productivity defined as the change in GDP 
per hour  of labour worked and Δ(I/P) is the net immigration rate. The differencing 
has purged the equation of the fixed effects and of any potential biases they may 
introduce. It also effectively removes all time invariant variables that could possibly 
be included in vector X.  
 
The estimated value of  1 β  in equation (3) measures the impact of immigrant 
inflows on wage growth and should not reflect any simultaneous causality in the 
opposite direction. However, immigrants come to a country where their skills are in 
demand, and hence an important endogeneity problem may be created by the 
choice of destination country. Furthermore, as noted by Borjas (1987b), immigrants 
who choose to come to Australia are probably not a random subset of the source 
counties’ workforce. We would expect those who immigrate to have higher 
expected earnings in Australia than in their country of origin, and vice versa for 
those who stay. Immigrants are, typically, ambitious, aggressive, and 
entrepreneurial. They, especially skilled migrants, move across international 
boundaries from one place of work and residence to another in order to exploit 
the economic opportunities that are accessible to them. It is also likely that the 
Australian government bases its immigration policy on past immigration rates.8  
 
These considerations imply that the current immigration rate is not exogenous. This 
endogeneity issue has previously been recognised in studies of local labour 
markets (Altonji and Card 1991, Friedberg 2001) but not in the context of cross-
border migration. These studies typically postulate that immigrants tend to move 
to cities or occupations where growth in demand for labour can accommodate 
their supply. Our study is not spatially based, and the endogeneity problems that 
may arise in the present context are at a greater level of aggregation. In terms of 
equation (3), if the migrant flow is not independent of ∆ε, then the conditional 
correlation between wages growth and immigrant share will confound the two 
directions of causation, and the estimate of  1 β  will be biased. If, for example, 
immigrants are more skilled, and if they choose high-skilled jobs that have better 
prospects of high wage growth in Australia, then the estimate of  1 β  will be biased 
upward. Conversely, if immigrants are concentrated in relatively low-paying jobs 
                                                 
8 While the immigration policy is generally described as a policy that balances social, 
economic, humanitarian and environmental objectives, it is ultimately the government 
that sets the rate – presumably keeping in m i n d  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  o t h e r  
considerations relevant to potential migrants.  12 
 
with little or no prospect of wage growth - possibly due to lack of recognition of 
foreign qualifications, language barrier, or a dip in the earnings just after arrival - 
then the estimate of 1 β  will be biased downward, leading to underestimation of 
immigration’s effect.  
 
In order to resolve the endogeneity problem, a source of exogenous variation in 
immigration flows must be found. In the present time series context, such 
instruments must be correlated with the inflow of immigrants over time, but 
uncorrelated with the unobserved component of wages growth subsequent to 
their arrival.9 We follow Altonji and Card (1991), Card (2001a), Friedberg (2001) 
and use the lagged share of immigrants in the labour force as an instrument. The 
argument here is that the lagged value of the immigration share acts as 
information to potential immigrants about Australia’s policy towards immigration. 
Accordingly, we assume that the selection process or the immigrants’ decision to 
enter Australia is governed by the following relationship: 
 
(4a)                                                                                ) / ( ) / ( t j t t P I P I μ γ + Δ = Δ −  
 
where  ϕ is the lag between the decision to apply to immigrate or setting the 
immigration policy at time (t-ϕ) and actual entry at time τ.  
One problem with our choice of instrument could be that it does not capture the 
decision of every immigrant and, hence, that it explains only a part of the 
variation of the proportion of immigrants at time τ.  It follows that our instrumental 
variable should be interpreted as reflecting an estimate of a specific group – viz., 
those migrants whose behaviour is influenced by the instrument (Imbens and 
Angrist 1994). “This specificity of estimates is endemic to empirical research. All 
statistical methods …. have elements of this limitation when used to analyse 
phenomena with heterogeneous responses” (Angrist and Krueger 2001, p.78). In 
the present context, that subset of migrants is likely to be dominated by relatively 
skilled workers if the acquisition of skill is an indication of a worker’s inclination and 
ability to acquire and process job-relevant information. However, our IV estimates 
constitute an improvement over simple OLS as we also tackle the potential 
problem of omitted variables that are correlated with both the migration decision 
and the determination of wages.10  
 
The use of time series data at the national level avoids any bias toward zero that 
would be attributable to factor price equalization and endogenous regional 
                                                 
9 The instrumentation is also useful if the error term in equation (3) is correlated over time. 
10 This interpretation of IV is adopted in several prominent studies (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; 
Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996). 13 
 
choice by migrants. However, it introduces a different bias toward zero: 
Immigrants tend to come to countries when labour market outcomes are 
favourable. So we could also look for other potential instruments that can affect 
the migration decision and that are related to labour market outcomes. The 
unemployment rate could be particularly relevant for those migrants who are 
desperately looking for jobs while labour market conditions may capture salient 
aspects of Australia’s immigration policy. Australia is a growing and thriving 
economy. It has skill shortages in many areas. In order to alleviate the skill 
shortages the government may select immigrants on the basis of local labour 
market conditions. Under those conditions the selection process is governed by 
the following relationship 
 
(4b)                                                                                         ) / ( t j t t U P I υ γω + = Δ −  
 
Υτ is, as before, the unemployment rate and  j t U − ω  is the weighted average of 
antecedent unemployment rates (preceding time t-j). Since the immigration 
process from the time of the decision to migrate until the time of arrival takes 
considerable time, we select ϕ=6 in our quarterly data. The weight is taken over 
the six-quarter period (time t-ϕ is the weighted average of the t-ϕ-1, t-ϕ-2,….t-ϕ-6 
period). This specification is similar to Pischke and Velling (1997), Dustmann, Fabbri 
and Preston (2005). 
 
It is possible and, indeed, plausible that the pull of family or of the “diaspora” 
influences the choice of destination country. Immigrants may apply to Australia 
because their family and friends already live here or because of the presence of 
individuals with similar cultural and linguistic background. Therefore, a possible 
solution to the endogeneity problem is to use measures of historic settlement 
patterns as instruments for immigration inflows. Our use of the lagged immigrant 
share as an IV should partly address this concern. As can be seen from Appendix 
Table 2A and Figure 2A, family and “diaspora” are not prominent drivers of 
immigration flows to Australia. Rather, the overwhelming impression from the 
evidence reported there is the considerable change over time in the pattern of 
immigration by source country and region. Moreover, skilled immigrants enter 
Australia after satisfying the points system, and they tend to prefer countries that 
offer better job prospects or more favourable immigration policies and labour 
market conditions.  
 
Thus we use the past immigration rate and the past unemployment rate as sources 
of exogenous variation of the current immigration rate. The decision of skilled 14 
 
immigrants to migrate is based on past Australian immigration policy and on their 
prospects for success in the Australian labour market. Schematically, the decision 
path looks as follows: 
 
(Potential) Immigrant Æ Decision to leave home country Ælook at 
unemployment rates and/or stance of immigration policy in potential host 
country  Æ apply to host country for immigration (Æ get visa Æarrive in 
Australia Ælook for job Æ earn wage). 
 
The exclusion restriction implied by our instrumental variable regression is that, 
conditional on the controls included in the regression equation (3), the past 
unemployment rate and past immigration rate have no effect on today’s earnings 
growth other than through their effects on immigration. One concern with this 
exclusion restriction is that the historical (past) unemployment rate may have a 
direct effect on the current wage rate which may attract immigrants to Australia. 
To capture this effect we should include among the explanatory variables a 
measure of the effect of the past unemployment rate on the wage level received 
by immigrants. However, note that we are measuring the growth of wages, as 
opposed to the level of wages at time τ. We consider it unlikely that the historical 
unemployment rate exerts a prominent influence on current wage increases. The 
same considerations apply to the policy variable - the past immigration rate. 
Therefore, our exclusion restrictions are quite plausible. Since we are dealing with 
aggregate time series data for Australia we do not need to worry about internal 
migration by natives in response to immigration inflows and subsequent changes in 
labour market outcomes. This is usually the case when one is dealing with single 
cross-section data or local labour market situations (Pischke and Velling 1997, 
Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston 2005, Halton and Tani 2005, Borjas 2006).11 
 
Figure 1 shows a strong positive relationship between the past (6-quarter lagged) 
immigration rate and its current level. The visual impression is confirmed by a 
statistically significant positive coefficient obtained from regressing current on past 
immigration rates.12 This strong association corroborates our conjecture that the 
relationship between wages and the immigration rate is influenced by the 
antecedent immigration policy and labour market. Without consideration of such 
                                                 
11 One assumption we maintain here is that native skilled workers are not emigrating from 
Australia in response to the arrival of skilled immigrants. It is, however, possible that the 
overall gain in skilled workers to Australia from international movement may be obscuring 
significant losses amongst highly educated workers (especially who are emigrating out) 
(see also footnote 15).   
12 In the following section we provide multiple justifications of the validity of the instrument. 15 
 
endogeneity the relationship between wage growth and the immigration rate 
might be obscured by changes in the immigration policy. 
 
With two instruments for our single endogenous regressor we estimate equation (3) 
using two stage least squares (2SLS).13 It is expected that the 2SLS estimates 
improve efficiency relative to OLS and provide better control for earnings growth. 
We account for possible serial correlation by computing Huber-White standard 
errors. In the presence of overidentifying restrictions it is sometimes useful to obtain 
a more efficient estimator when serial correlation may be present by applying the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) conditions (Hansen 1982). Since our 2SLS 
with robust standard errors is δε φαχτο  a GMM estimator we need not conduct 
separate GMM estimation as this may generate only small additional gains. 
Moreover, GMM suffers from small sample bias. Given that we are dealing with a 
small sample, using GMM would not seem appropriate.14 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Quarterly skilled-based immigration data for the period 1980-2006 were obtained 
by special request from the ABS. The net immigration rate is expressed as the total 
number of immigrants in a given quarter per one thousand adult (15-64 years of 
age) Australians in that quarter. It represents the movement of migrants who have 
been granted the right to live permanently in Australia.15 Measuring skilled migrant 
                                                 
13 In this paper the term IV and 2SLS are not interchangeable. We refer to 2SLS estimate 
when we use multiple instruments, and to IV estimate in the case of a single instrument. 
14 One problem with our specification in equation (3) is that we might be estimating short-
run effects as opposed to long-run effects of immigration since there is a short period of 
time (a quarter) between the earliest and latest observations and differencing eliminates 
the long-run effect. Many authors (e.g., Pischke and Velling 1997, Friedberg 2001) have 
estimated the same type of equation for examining the labour market impact of 
immigration. An additional problem with level of wage as opposed to change in wage as 
the  dependent variable is that variables with high persistence  over time (such as weekly 
wage) will have very low correlation between flow variable (immigration rate) and the 
level variable (wage). This problem of weak instruments can lead to substantial bias in finite 
sample. 
15 This definition usually applies to persons born outside Australia but may also apply to a 
small number of persons born inside Australia to parents who are foreign nationals. Note 
that the migration rate used here differs from the ‘net migration’ rate as the data did not 
include individuals departing Australia. According to the Productivity Commission report 
(2006), there has been a significant movement of people from Australia on a long-term 
basis in recent decades. But this proportion is relatively small for the Australian-born 
population. A significant share of emigrants consists of former permanent settlers and 
overseas visitors returning overseas. Moreover, a large number of Australian residents are 
also returning home every year. So, net Australian-born emigration is relatively low. Casual 
observation suggests that many Australian-born high skilled workers emigrate because of 
the relatively compressed domestic wage structure. However, to the extent that 
Australian-born and other permanent residents are emigrating in response to the inflow of 16 
 
flows is problematic because the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIC) 
in Australia records measures inflows by visa type, which may not reflect the 
usually defined general skills. The DIC defines skilled migrant workers as those 
people who have skills in particular occupations that are ρεθυιρεδ  in Australia. 
These occupations are identified in the skilled occupation list. The demand list 
contains a list of domestic occupations and specialisations for which there is an 
continuing national shortage. Unlike immigration Australia, we measure skill by the 
occupation of immigrants as stated in the landing card of the permanent visa 
category of immigrants at their first entry in Australia. Since most of the visas 
granted by immigration Australia under the skilled category fall under the general 
skill stream there is substantial agreement between the two definitions. Our 
practice reflects a preference for defining skill in terms of generic attributes of 
migrants rather than temporary labour market requirements in the host country. 
The migrant attributes provide a better guide to the extent of human capital 
inflow into the host country. See Appendix note on the definition of the skilled 
immigration in our data.  
 
The unemployment rate is the percentage of the labour force that actively seeks 
work but is unable to find work in a particular quarter. Nominal wage data include 
average weekly compensation paid during the calendar quarter to all employees 
in Australia, regardless of when the services were performed. Since time series 
data for wages of native skilled and unskilled workers is not available for Australia, 
we use aggregate wages as the dependent variable in our regression. Labour 
productivity is defined as GDP (at constant prices) per hour worked. The measures 
of labour productivity we use are presented as indices and as rates of change. 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables of interest. The first two 
columns provide the mean and standard deviation of the whole sample. Average 
weekly wages of all workers have increased significantly over the observation 
period while unemployment has been declining. The average unemployment rate 
in recent years (2000-2006) is below the corresponding average over the entire 
observation period. The average change in the unemployment rate from its 
immediately preceding quarter is negative. Productivity is increasing over time. 
However, the average change in productivity, or productivity growth, of a given 
quarter compared to its immediately preceding quarter has slowed in 2000-06 
compared to 1990-99. The immigration rate is relatively volatile (Figure 2). It 
declined from a relatively high level of 2.5 in the initial period to 1.8 in 1990-99. 
                                                                                                                                                    
permanent migrants into Australia, our estimates will provide an upward bound of the true 
effects of immigration. For more details about composition of the emigrating population 
and the reasons for emigrating from Australia see Productivity Commission (2006).  17 
 
However, the number and proportion of new immigrants has increased again in 
recent years to an average rate of 2.0 though the rate is yet to match its 1980 
level (Table 1). The proportion of skilled migrants has increased continuously over 
the observation period. On average, Australia received 2.3 skilled migrants for 
every unskilled migrant. That ratio has increased almost threefold over the 
observation period, rising from 1.4 in the 1980s to 3.4 in the 1990s and to 4.1 in the 
most recent period. Immigrants who were not of working age or did not 
adequately describe their occupational status at the time of arrival were not 
classified as either skilled or unskilled but were included in the total immigration 
rate.  
 
Figure 3 shows a positive but not very strong relationship between earnings growth 
in Australia and the immigration rate. Bi-variate regression analysis confirms that it is 
statistically insignificant. In the next section we will determine whether this 
apparent relationship represents any causal effect of immigration on wages or 
whether it is merely a correlation. Finally, before running the regression, we check if 
there is any trend or persistent component in the dependent and independent 
variables of interest. Since we are dealing with time series data, we need to ensure 
that our specification is not contaminated by spurious relationships. Figure 3A in 
the appendix plots all the variables that are of interest in our regressions. It is 
apparent that there is no time trend or persistent component in the data that can 
potentially harm the results. By differencing the variables we have, in fact, 
removed any drift or time trend.  
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1 Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
 
The top Panel of Table 2 reports the ordinary least-squares (OLS) results from 
regressing growth of weekly wages on the immigration rate, with and without 
controlling for changes in the unemployment rate and productivity growth.16 In 
Columns 1, 4, and 7 we consider the immigration rate as the sole covariate. 
Columns 2, 5, and 8 control for the change in the unemployment rate but exclude 
productivity. Columns 3, 6, and 9 report the results using the full set of covariates. 
Overall the results indicate that the immigration rate has a consistently significant 
positive effect on wages, irrespective of specification. The first three columns show 
that total immigration exerts a highly significant (1% level) impact on wages in the 
Australian labour market. A one unit change in the immigration rate changes the 
                                                 
16 We examine changes in wages as opposed to the perhaps more natural log 
specification because changes in wages between quarters are sometimes zero. In a log 
specification, the results can be fairly sensitive to how we deal with zero values. 18 
 
growth of the quarterly weekly wage by AD$1.55-$1.67. In terms of percentages, a 
10 percent increase in the immigration rate is associated with 1.9-2 percent rise in 
the average wage of all workers.17 The following two sets of three columns show 
that this qualitative finding applies to both component groups, skilled and unskilled 
migrants. The magnitude of the effect is consistently larger (approximately double) 
for skilled migrants than for all migrants, but the level of significance is lower 
(columns 4-6). The effect is even stronger in the case of unskilled migrants, and 
statistically as significant as for all migrants (columns 7-9). Note also that in all three 
alternative specifications the magnitude of the coefficient of the immigration rate 
diminishes as we control for both changes in the unemployment rate and 
productivity growth. But the coefficients and the sign of the relationship remain 
stable and significant.  
 
5.2 First-stage Estimation  
 
We examine the first-stage of IV regressions with the immigration rate as the 
dependent variable. Equation (5) describes the relationship between the current 
and past immigration rates (immigration policy) and the past unemployment 
(labour market outcomes) rate in reduced form.  
 
(5)                         ) /   (   ) / ( 4 6 3 2 6 1 0 t t t t t t prod U U P I P I ϑ φ ω φ ω φ φ φ + Δ × + + + Δ + = Δ − −  
 
 where  (I/P),  U and prod are defined as above. The residual  t ϑ captures other 
factors that are correlated with the immigration rate and may be correlated with 
∆є in equation (3). Table 3 reports the OLS results for equation (5) with different 
specifications using the total immigration rate as the dependent variable.18 
Columns 1-4 show that both instruments, the past immigration rate and past 
unemployment rate, are statistically significant at the one percent level. Columns 
5 and 6 indicate that both instruments are also statistically significant individually. 
Thus, both the past immigration rate and past unemployment rate appear to carry 
good explanatory power for the current immigration rate while the change in the 
unemployment rate is not a particularly reliable estimator. This suggests that the 
selected instruments are not weak, and that their use carries no potential bias. 
Although these findings are not conclusive, they are indicative and corroborate 
the usefulness of our instruments. 
                                                 
17 Since we are using level as opposed to log of the change in wages as the dependent 
variable, we need to divide the coefficient estimates by the mean value of the 
dependent variable to get the results in terms of percentages.  
18 The results for skilled and unskilled immigration rate similar to that of results reported here. 
So we not report those results for brevity. 19 
 
 
5.3 Reduced Form Estimates  
Based on our previous specifications, we run the following reduced form 
regression:  
 
(6)                                             ) /   (   4 3 6 2 6 1 0 t t t t t t prod U U P I W ζ α α ω α α α + Δ × + Δ + + Δ + = Δ − −  
 
The reduced form estimation illustrates the causal effect of the instrumental 
variable(s) on the outcome of interest - growth of average weekly earnings. 
Concerns about weak instruments can be readily mitigated by looking at the 
reduced form equations. These estimates are unbiased, even if the instruments are 
weak. The results presented in Table 4 produce a fairly strong relationship between 
instrument and changes in wage. The first two columns of the Table suggest that 
the past immigration rate and past unemployment rate each have statistically 
significant effects on wages growth, and that the instruments are not weak. The 
sign of the coefficient estimates suggest that past immigration rate has a positive 
effect, while the past unemployment rate has the opposite effect on wage 
growth. This indirectly supports the conjecture about the endogeneity of 
immigration with immigration policy and labour market outcomes as potentially 
prominent drivers of the migration process. When we use both instruments in the 
reduced form equation (last column, Table 4), the past immigration rate yields a 
statistically insignificant positive effect for the changes in wage (t-ratio=1.44). This 
implies that, once past unemployment rate is controlled for, past immigration rate 
becomes less important in determining current wage growth.  Though the 
magnitude of the immigration rate coefficients becomes less than half, they 
remain at an economically significant level. However, the reduced form estimates 
in columns 1 and 2 are each statistically significantly different from zero, and 
therefore they support the presumption that the immigration rate without the 
controls does exert a systematic influence on changes in wages in Australia (see 
Angrist and Krueger 2001). 19 
 
5.4 Instrumental Variable Estimates 
 
Instead of treating the immigration rate as exogenous we now assume that it is 
endogenous. Panel B of Table 2 reports the results of IV estimations when the past 
                                                 
19 In general, there need not be any relationship between significance of the reduced 
form and the significance for 2SLS estimates. However, we need a strong first-stage to 
ensure that we are not using a weak instrument. The standard IV/2SLS estimator, (z´x)-1 z´y, 
with dependent variable with regressor x, and instrument z, breaks down when z´x is near 
singular while it does not when z´y approaches zero.  
 20 
 
immigration rate – a proxy for the policy variable - is used as an instrument. The 
identification strategy here is that the past immigration rate does not directly 
influence the current growth of weekly wages in the Australian labour market. 
Since we are using the six-quarter lagged immigration rate as the past immigration 
rate there is no α πριορι reason to think that such lagged immigration is likely to 
cause the growth of current wages. However, we allow the past immigration rate 
to affect current wages growth through its effects on the current immigration rate.  
 
The IV estimates presented in panel B of Table 2 display some qualitative similarities 
with the OLS estimates in panel A. One notable difference is that the sign of the 
unemployment rate when explaining the effect of skilled migrants changes sign in 
the IV estimates. The magnitude of the coefficients of the total immigration rate 
and unskilled immigration rate is significantly larger in the IV estimations (columns 
1-3 and columns 6-9). We reject that they are the same using standard Hausman 
Test (i.e., the difference in coefficient estimates using OLS and IV are systematic). 
The coefficients of skilled migration rate become statistically insignificant. The 
results indicate that the endogeneity bias is more important in the case of skilled 
migration and the bias is quantitatively important in case of unskilled and total 
migration rates.  
 
Panel B shows that the current immigration rate has a positive and statistically 
significant (at the 5% significance level) impact on current wages growth as does 
the rate of unskilled immigrants. However, the explanatory power of the IV 
estimates deteriorates sharply when the effect of skilled immigration on wages 
growth is estimated. None of the three specifications shows a statistically 
significant effect of the rate of skilled immigrants on domestic wages growth. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that skilled immigration does not exert a robust 
influence on wages growth in the Australian labour market. This result also 
indicates that we need to take the endogeneity of the immigration rate into 
account. 
 
5.5 Two Stage Least Squares Estimates 
 
We now consider both instruments, the past immigration rate and past 
unemployment rate, simultaneously. The first stage involves regressing the 
immigration rate on all predetermined variables (equation 5). The estimates are 
presented in panel A of Table 5. The exclusion restriction is that the instruments do 
not appear in equation (3). 
 21 
 
2SLS estimates do not generate any sound evidence that the immigrant flows 
exert a systematic effect on domestic wages growth. The current total immigration 
rate is statistically significant (at the 10% level) in the first two specifications 
(columns 1 & 2). But its explanatory power vanishes in the full covariate 
specification of the wage equation, i.e. when both, the change in the 
unemployment rate and in productivity growth, are included in the estimation. 
Estimates with the unskilled immigration rate display a statistically significant effect 
on wage change while none of the skilled immigration rate specifications 
generate any statistically significant effects. The coefficient estimates of the 
unskilled migration rate indicate that a 10 percent increase in the immigration rate 
will result in wage growth of about 6 percent. 
 
IV and 2SLS estimators are popular and have been used extensively in the 
literature. Even though they may be consistent, several recent studies (e.g., Bound 
ετ αλ. 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997) point out that the finite sample properties of 
both estimators can be very poor especially when the sample size is very small or 
the instruments are weak. Often very large samples are needed for the asymptotic 
properties to yield good approximations. Both IV and 2SLS estimates are biased 
towards the probability limit of OLS estimates. This bias is due to the use of the ι-τη 
observation in constructing the optimal instrument for the ι-τη observation and 
therefore can generate misleading results (Angrist, Imbens and Krueger 1999).  
 
6. Robustness Check  
6.1 Jackknife Instrumental Variable Estimates (JIVE) 
 
The 2SLS estimator can also suffer from bias that is exacerbated when the 
instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables and when 
many instruments are used. In such situations JIVE (proposed initially by Angrist, 
Imbens and Krueger 1999) performs better than 2SLS. JIVE estimators eliminate the 
correlation between the first-stage fitted values and the structural error term that 
causes the traditional 2SLS estimator to be biased. Though it has the same finite 
sample properties as limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimators, 
Angrist  ετ αλ. have shown that under certain forms of misspecification the JIVE 
estimator may have less bias. It is also a useful alternative in applications when 
there is concern about the number of instruments. 
 
The computational requirements for JIVE are of the order of those required for 









In the case of 2SLS, the instrument for x is  π ˆ Z′ and the ι-th row of the estimated 
instrument can be written as: 
 
 
JIVE removes the dependence of the constructed instrument  π ˆ i Z′  on the 
endogenous regressor for observation  ι by using i π ~ , which is calculated from the 
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Thus JIVE can be estimated with two passes through the data.20 It involves 
computing  π ˆ  and the leverage, which we denote by ηι, in the first stage. The 
second-stage involves removing the influence of the ι-th observation. Then we 
calculate (using  Z i π ~ as an instrument)    
y X X X JIVE JIVE JIVE ′ ′ =
− ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ 1 β  
where,  ) ( ~ ˆ
, i Z X i i JIVE π = ′  
Panel B of Table 5 shows the results obtained with JIVE. While the signs of the 
immigration rate in all three variants are same to those obtained from 2SLS 
estimates, the overall immigration variables lack explanatory power. The 
coefficient estimates corresponding to the skilled and total immigration rates are 
statistically insignificant. The results from JIVE estimators indicate that there is no 
robust evidence that skilled immigration affects wage growth in Australia, 
positively or adversely. Unskilled workers continue to exert a statistically significant 
positive effect on wage growth while the skilled immigration rate does not have 
any robust influence. The magnitude of the coefficients for the unskilled migration 
rate is similar to those obtained using 2SLS estimate. The point estimates suggest 
                                                 
20 Angrist, Imbens and Krueger (1999) propose two types of JIVE: JIVE1 and JIVE2. Monte 
Carlo simulations suggest both estimators typically perform similarly. Our results also confirm 
this. We therefore report the JIVE1 estimator here. Blomquist and Dahlberg (1999) suggest 
two other JIVE estimators. Again Monte Carlo evidence indicates that Angrist ετ αλ. JIVE 
estimators are preferable. 
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that a 10 percent rise in the immigration rate increases Australian wages by about 
2.2 to 2.5 percent.21  
 
6.2 Tests for Validity of Instruments 
An important concern with an IV approach is the possible use of weak instruments, 
which tends to bias 2SLS estimates toward OLS estimates and may weaken 
standard tests for endogeneity. The existing econometric literature defines 
weakness of instrument based on the strength of the first-stage equation (e.g., 
Staiger and Stock, Stock and Yogo 2004). Accordingly, we test the relevance and 
validity of the instruments. Specifically, we test whether the IVs are correlated with 
the endogenous regressor and orthogonal to the error process. We test the first 
condition by examining the fit of the first stage reduced form regression of the 
immigration rate on the full set of instruments - both included and excluded 
instruments for the 2SLS. We use the F-test of the joint significance of the excluded 
instruments in the first stage regression. The F-test rejects the null that the 
instruments are jointly insignificant (Table 3). This test for weak instruments implies 
that our first stage has good power, and that our instruments are not weak. The 
instruments are both individually significant as is evident from the first stage 
reduced form regression coefficient estimates and the corresponding standard 
errors shown in Table 3. 
 
We further check the relevance of instruments using a “partial R2” measure 
proposed by Shea (1997) that takes intercorrelations among the instruments into 
account. We also use a commonly used statistic (recommended, e.g., by Bound 
ετ αλ. 1995), the partial R2 of the regression of endogenous variables on the 
excluded set of instruments. When we have a single instrument Shea’s partial R2 
and the usual partial R2 measures should be the same. But with multiple 
endogenous variables the two statistics should be different (Baum, Schaffer and 
Stillman 2003). Shea’s partial R2 ranges from 0.25 to 0.31 in our four models. Thus, 
our instruments pass both the criteria recommended by Bound ετ αλ. (1995) and 
Shea (1997). 
 
It is possible that there are weak instruments even if, in the first stage, each 
instrument is significant at the conventional level of significance. Staiger and Stock 
(1997) suggest a rule of thumb which applies to our single endogenous variable 
case, that an Φ-statistic below 10 is a cause for concern. All of our four models 
                                                 
21 We also experiment with GMM estimates. The results are qualitatively similar to those of 
JIVE and 2SLS estimates. The results are available on request. 24 
 
pass this operational criterion as well since the values of the Φ-statistics are well 
above 10 in all cases (see Table 3).  
 
We now ascertain instrument independence from the observable error process. 
Since there are more instruments than the number of endogenous variables the 
equation is overidentified. We can test the orthogonality conditions of instruments 
with that of the error process. We test the overidentification problem through the 
common ϑ-statistic of Hansen (1982). Under the null hypothesis of orthogonality we 
cannot reject it in all cases (Table 3). This confirms that the instruments are truly 
exogenous. The results are also confirmed by Sargan’s (1958) statistic which is a 
special case of Hansen’s ϑ under the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity. 
We also adopt the general Hausman (1978) test of endogeneity. Under the null 
hypothesis that OLS is an appropriate estimation technique, we reject the null and 
conclude that the immigration rate is truly endogenous (Table 3).  
 
6.3 Discussion and Interpretation 
 
The results that correct the endogeneity of immigration rate reveal the following 
(by comparing OLS estimates with that of 2SLS and JIVE): (1) the coefficient 
estimates using later methods are lower (but statistically insignificant) in case of 
skilled migration rate;22 (2) OLS estimates of unskilled migration rate coefficients are 
downward biased. As a robustness check, we also experiment with a specification 
that includes both skilled and unskilled migration rates as covariates in the same 
equation using full set of instruments. The resulting coefficient estimates capture 
the partial effect of each skilled category of migrant. The results, not reported 
here, are similar. While the magnitude of the coefficients becomes slightly smaller 
than 2SLS/JIVE reported in Table 5, they remain larger than the OLS estimates. For 
the skilled migration rate the coefficient estimates become positive (t ratio= 
+2/2.8=0.71) but OLS estimates still remain upward biased.23 So, our conclusion 
                                                 
22 The results for skilled migration rate using single instrument are different (in terms of both 
sign and magnitude) from those obtained with multiple instrument 2SLS and JIVE estimates. 
This is not unusual in the IV literature. For example, Friedberg (2001) finds that the effects of 
immigration, once the immigration rate is instrumented, are opposite to those of OLS 
estimates. The divergence of the results using single and multiple instruments, respectively, 
for skilled migration is probably a combination of weak instrument and small sample 
problems. In particular, skilled migrants are probably less likely to be induced to take 
migration decision by looking at past immigration policy. Rather they look at the labour 
market characteristics. So we argue that the endogeneity issue, especially for skilled 
migration, is better dealt with using 2SLS/JIVE.  We therefore focus on the OLS, 2SLS and 
JIVE estimates. 
23 We also conduct the Wald test of the equality of coefficients between skilled and 
unskilled migration rates, and reject the null hypothesis. 25 
 
regarding 2SLS/JIVE also holds here. For skilled migrants, we conclude that OLS 
estimates tend to overestimate the effects of immigration. Once the endogeneity 
is taken into account skilled immigrants do not have any influence on wage 
growth in Australia. The results for the unskilled migration rate do not change either 
- OLS continues to underestimate the true effect. 
 
Even though the results are not unusual, it is particularly helpful to understand why 
and how this might be the case. Since OLS estimates are lower than the estimates 
that take endogeneity into account skilled migration is subject to positive 
selection. If high ability individuals are migrating to Australia, then the omitted 
ability characteristic affects both earnings capacity and the immigration decision. 
Once such endogeneity is taken into account the IV estimates should be smaller 
than the OLS estimates. Hence, our results conform to the theoretical prediction. 
The positive selection implies that skilled immigrants can choose to enter high 
wage occupations (since skills are classified by occupation). This implies that there 
might be a positive correlation between earnings potential in Australia, general 
talent and skilled migration. This could also imply that there are shortages of skilled 
workers in Australia and, therefore, skilled workers can get the job. This then implies 
also that immigrants with very high expected returns to skill are likely to migrate to 
Australia if the skills in the source country are correlated with skills valued in 
Australia. These results could also hold if more skilled workers get jobs in the skilled 
labour market while relatively less skilled migrants switch to unskilled professions or 
out-migrate from Australia. 
 
The estimation results for unskilled migrants suggest negative selection since OLS 
estimates are lower than the instrumented migration rate coefficients. Negative 
selection implies that there is a negative correlation between the exogenous 
component of wage growth and unskilled migration flow into Australia. The 
difference between OLS and IV estimates is, therefore, due probably to 
immigrants entering disproportionately into unskilled occupations. This can happen 
for many reasons including the case that the host country is relatively attractive to 
low earning workers.24 The results imply that immigrants with best expected or 
realized unskilled labour market outcomes choose to migrate to Australia as 
unskilled migrants. This could happen, for example, moderately skilled immigrants 
may choose to migrate to Australia as unskilled migrants if they can expect above 
                                                 
24 Wu et al. (2007) find that immigrants to Australia, especially those coming from non-
western regions, are channeled into inferior jobs post migration. Chiswick and Miller (2007) 
document that the limited international transferability of human capital skills results in 
immigrants being channeled into relatively low status occupations when they first enter the 
Australian labour market. 26 
 
average labour market outcomes, or labour market outcomes that are superior to 
those available in other potential destination countries. This would also imply that 
there exists a considerable earnings premium in Australia for unskilled migrants.   
Given the high relative minimum wage in Australia compared to similar other 
immigrant receiving countries (e.g., US and Canada) this seems plausible. The 
wage structure in Australia ‘subsidizes’ low skilled workers, attracting low skilled 
workers from abroad. In other words, low skill workers want to migrate to take 
advantage of the ‘insurance’ provided by Australia, and by migrating to Australia 
rather than elsewhere they receive an ‘earnings premium’. The possibility of the 
coexistence of earnings premium with negative selection has been raised by 
Kugler and Sauer (2005) in the context of occupational choice by immigrants in 
Israel.25  
 
In fact there are other possible explanations of these results. For example, 
measurement errors in OLS estimates that could be attributable to misclassification 
by DIC of immigrants into the unskilled category. Or skilled migrants work as 
unskilled workers after migrating to Australia because of onerous labour market 
requirements for skilled workers or, for that matter, language and other barriers or 
because the wage structure favours unskilled workers. They might choose to work 
as unskilled worker to avoid stringent labour market qualifications or to avoid large 
investments to acquire relevant skills. This happens because of the existence of 
outside (unskilled sector) earnings potential. So the difference may be attributable 
to the fact that OLS estimates do not correct biases caused by measurement 
errors while 2SLS estimate does. However, the measurement error alone is unlikely 
to account for the entire difference in the estimates.26 The divergence between 
OLS and 2SLS/JIVE estimates may therefore largely be attributed to the 
endogeneity bias argument. 27 
 
Our results, however, suggest that the effect of immigration on wages can vary 
substantially depending on the type of migrant labour. That is, there is 
                                                 
25 Anecol, Cobb-Clark and Trejo (2003) argue that for many reasons (stronger labour 
unions, higher minimum wage, national health insurance and welfare systems), workers in 
the lower end of income distribution are generally better off in Australia and Canada than 
in the United States. Since the minim wage in Australia is very high compared to Canada 
while both countries have similar welfare and health systems it is likely that the Australian 
labour market favors unskilled workers more than the Canadian labour market. 
26 For example, Card (2001b) examines 11 quasi-experimental studies conducting 2SLS and 
OLS estimates of returns to schooling, and finds that measurement error can account for at 
most a 10 percent difference between the OLS and 2SLS estimates. 
27 Given the nature of the data, it is not generally possible to conduct a direct test of the 
above theoretical conjecture. However, if one uses micro data, some of the implications 
can be tested, αλβειτ indirectly. 27 
 
heterogeneity in the labour market outcome of the effects of skilled and unskilled 
migration.28  
 
The absence of a negative overall impact of immigration on wage growth might 
be explained by highly inelastic domestic labour supply or highly elastic labour 
demand in Australia. Our findings suggest the possibility of complementarity 
between Australian-born workers and immigrant workers. This complementarity is 
stronger in the case of unskilled workers. We have not found any evidence to 
suggest that skilled migrants are either substitute or complements to native 
workers. It is possible, for example, that assignment of unskilled immigrants to 
relatively basic jobs or supportive roles releases Australians to works on the more 
productive aspects of the job. For example, Friedman (2001) and Kugler and 
Sauer (2005)  point out that in Israel Russian doctors - even those with considerable 
prior experience and earnings - filled positions at the lower end of the job ladder, 
pushing Israelis up the ranks into more supervisory, high-paying roles. Anecdotal 
evidence supports this adjustment in the context of Australia. Informal observation, 
for example, of retail workers, hospitality service workers, office clerks, and others 
reveals that many unskilled immigrants often perform lower-level work, with 




The large and growing scale of cross-border migration imparts a crucial role to 
immigration policy in potential host countries. National policymakers need to 
resolve the potential conflict between improvements in national growth and 
economic performance on the one hand and deterioration in labour market 
outcomes for native workers on the other. Neither economic theory nor empirical 
investigation provides consistent support for the widespread perception that 
immigrants take jobs or wages, or both, from native workers. Even if it is conceded 
that labour market outcomes need not be harmful concern about adverse 
sectoral labour market effects remain in the public domain. The general 
presumption is that the inevitable mismatch between the composition of the 
                                                 
28 On e no tab le li mi ta tion  of 2SLS  es ti ma tes  is th a t i t uses o nly a  par t o f th e varia ti on in 
immigration rates that is induced by the instrument(s) (those who decide to migrate to 
Australia on the basis of its immigration policy or labour market outcome) whereas OLS 
estimates use all variation (Imbens and Angrist 1994). If the marginal effects of immigration 
vary between those induced by the instruments and those who are not, then the 
estimated average effect of immigration will differ. However, as noted above, 2SLS 
estimates are an improvement over OLS estimates as we take the selection bias into 
account in the former. Moreover, IV estimates are consistent while OLS estimate may be 
biased. 28 
 
native labour force and immigrant flows creates sectoral market imbalances 
which can be removed only through price (wage) and quantity (employment) 
adjustments. The progressive reorientation of Australia’s immigration policy from 
family unification to skill acquisition tends to fuel those apprehensions of native 
workers. 
 
Accordingly, the present paper explores systematically the impact of immigration 
on labour market opportunities and the assimilation of immigrants into the 
domestic labour market in Australia. Specifically, we recognize the heterogeneous 
nature of the pool of immigrants and the recent thrust of Australian immigration 
policy to support skill-intensive migrants. From the many differentiating 
characteristics of migrants we emphasize the distinction between skilled and 
unskilled labour qualifications. Not only does that distinction capture the thrust 
about Australia’s immigration policy, it also recognizes, albeit in a qualitative way, 
the augmentation of the host country’s stock of human capital that is generated 
from the influx of migrants.  
 
The concrete empirical exercise involves estimating the impact of skilled 
immigrants on wages in the host country, Australia. The potential problem of 
endogeneity due to selection and self-selection of immigrants is addressed by 
using various instrumental variable approaches that exploit antecedent 
immigration policy and labour market outcomes. The multiple instrument 2SLS 
estimates capture both the Australian government immigration policy and self-
selection by immigrants. Given the smallness of the present sample, the robustness 
of the results of the 2SLS estimation is verified by an alternative IV estimator, JIVE, 
which is suitable in our context. The JIVE estimator can simultaneously take care of 
the small sample bias problems in 2SLS. JIVE is also better suited if weak instruments 
are used.  
 
We demonstrate the validity of the selected instruments on the basis of theoretical 
considerations and subject this choice to empirical testing. These tests support the 
suitability of the instruments and, hence, the analytical soundness of our results. 
The contrast between OLS and different versions of the instrumental variable 
suggest that the immigration rate is not independent of the unobserved 
determinant of wages. In fact, overestimation in OLS regressions of the effects of 
immigration on wages provides evidence of negative selection for unskilled 
migration. We also find evidence of positive selection in the case of skilled 
migrants supporting the fact that they can choose to go to relatively high wage 
occupations. However, there are other possible explanations in support of our 
results (e.g., measurement error) and more research is needed to resolve these 29 
 
issues. Unfortunately, limitations of our available data prevent us from pursuing 
such investigations. In future, we attempt to address the selection issue using more 
comprehensive data. 
 
The core finding is that there is no robust evidence that immigration exerts 
discernible adverse consequence on wages in the Australian labour market. This 
basic finding holds whether the immigration rate is specified in aggregate form or 
whether it is decomposed into the two main subsets of skilled and unskilled 
immigrants. In fact, there is some evidence that overall immigration may exert 
positive effects on wages in Australia. 
 
One obvious limitation of the present investigation is the failure to explicitly allow 
for international movements of capital. Australia is a small open economy (SOE). 
Insofar as immigration affects relative factor returns it will elicit a capital account 
response. Typically, in simple aggregate SOE models, the induced capital flows will 
tend to re-establish relative factor returns with the net result that both the stock of 
the domestic labour force and capital have been augmented in response to 
immigration. The capital flow response becomes significantly more complex as 
multiple categories of labour and capital are recognized with potential 
complementarity and substitutability relations between the various components of 
each factor group. The consequence of this increasing complexity is that 
analytical results become more equivocal while the available data for empirical 
testing cease to match the analytical constructs. Furthermore, there is little 
evidence to suggest that any labour market disturbances that may be induced by 
migrant flows are likely to create relative factor price changes of sufficient 
magnitude to drive large-scale cross-border capital movements. The analytical 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Key Variables 
   1980-2006     1980-1990    1991-1999      2000-2006 
 Variables  Mean  
Std 
Dev     Mean  
Std 
Dev     Mean    Std Dev     Mean   Std Dev 
Average weekly wages per 
quarter  683.4  208.3  457.5  71.2   694.5  68.0   956.4  84.9 
Quarterly Unemployment 
Rate  7.71  1.58  7.84  1.28  8.80  1.23   5.99  0.61 
Immigration rate per 1000 
Australian 2.1093  0.5166    2.505  0.5822    1.8235  0.343   2.0144  0.2705 
          Skilled immigrants  0.666  0.162  0.641  0.197  0.611 0.106   0.772 0.101 
          Unskilled immigrants  0.294  0.162    0.458  0.132    0.179  0.023    0.187  0.040 
Productivity  83.87  10.19  73.28  1.69   83.68  5.05   97.70  2.86 
Growth of weekly wage of 
all 8.21  3.21    7.92  1.89    6.19  2.47    11.48  2.87 
change in unemployment 
rate  -0.038  0.288   -0.032  0.355   -0.026  0.294   -0.061  0.166 
Change in productivity  0.342  0.424     0.194 0.451      0.492 0.316     0.316 0.467 
 
Notes: Skilled and unskilled migration rates represent the share of each migration category in total migration. 
A large number of immigrants did not reveal their occupation at their country of origin during their first 











Table 2: OLS and IV Estimates of the Effects of Immigration on Unemployment 
 
Panel A: Ordinary Least squares Estimates (OLS) 
                   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Total immigrants  Skilled immigrants  Unskilled immigrants 
Net  immigration  rate  1.66  1.67  1.55 3.6 3.55  3.18  4.22  4.27  3.89 
 (0.39)*  (0.39)*  (0.40)*  (1.77)**  (1.78)**  (1.75)+  (1.30)*  (1.30)*  (1.38)* 
Change in 
unemployment  rate    -0.093  0.011  0.116  0.23   0.572  0.635 
    (0.970)  (0.963)  (1.038)  (1.017)  (0.877)  (0.875) 
Change  in  productivity     -0.477    -0.566    -0.537 
     (0.297)      (0.297)+      (0.312)+ 
R-squared  0.1 0.1  0.12 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 
Panel B: Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates 
Net  immigration  rate  2.65  2.98 2.91 5.97 6.15 6.24 6.66 6.06 5.81 
 (1.08)**  (1.23)** (1.29)**  (3.66)  (3.89)  (3.78)  (1.97)*  (1.61)*  (1.71)* 
Change in 
unemployment  rate   -0.543  -0.476  -0.151  -0.096   0.61  0.668 
    (1.134)  (1.147)  (1.193)  (1.191)  (0.860)  (0.856) 
Change  in  productivity     -0.32    -0.48     -0.479 
     (0.345)    (0.334)    (0.319) 
R-squared  0.1 0.1  0.12 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a separate regression which also includes a constant term.  
The migration rate in a given period is the number of immigrants per one thousand adult (15-64 years of age) Australian 
population for that period. Skilled and unskilled migration rates are the share of each migration category in total migration. 
A large number of immigrants did not reveal their occupation at their country of origin during their first entry into Australia, so 
skilled and unskilled immigration rates do not add up to total migration rate. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses, + 




Table 3: First-Stage Regression: Immigration Decision 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change in unemployment rate1   0.023    0.166  0.17  0.514 
   (0.161)  (0.146)  (0.16)  (0.133)* 
Change in productivity1     -0.376  -0.399  -0.419  -0.48 
      (0.097)* (0.095)* (0.096)* (0.114)* 
Past  immigration  rate  0.539 0.534 0.518 0.483 0.389   
  (0.076)* (0.099)* (0.071)* (0.089)* (0.090)*   
Past unemployment rate1  0.116 0.116 0.112 0.113    0.056 
  (0.038)* (0.038)* (0.035)* (0.035)*    (0.030)+ 
Hansen’s J-Statistic ( Overidentification 
Test) [p=0.31]  [p=0.281]  [p=0.260]  [p=  0.33]     
F-test of Joint Significance of Instrument 
Set  [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]     
Shea’s Partial R2 0.2983  0.27  0.313  0.259     
Wu-Hausman F test  [p=0.061]  [p=0.076]  [p=0.109]  [p=0.092]     
Durbin-Wu-Hausman  chi-sq  test  [p=0.059] [p=0.071] [p=0.103] [p=0.085]     
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of 
all  instruments)  [p=0.368] [p=0.358] [p=  0.351] [p=0.434]     
Value of F-statistic (for instruments)  24.3  14.5  25.7  13.9     
R-squared  0.3  0.3 0.39 0.4 0.33  0.21 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression which also includes a constant term. Past unemployment rate and past 
immigration rate are six-quarter lags of the respective variable. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses, + significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.  




Table 4: Reduced Form Estimates 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Change in 
unemployment rate  -0.338  -0.084  -0.484 
 (0.921)  (0.848)  (0.838) 
Change in productivity  -0.613  -0.631  -0.594 
 (0.294)**  (0.287)**  (0.279)** 
Past immigration rate  1.205    0.576 
 (0.431)*    (0.399) 
past unemployment 
rate   -0.892  -0.827 
   (0.150)*  (0.158)* 
R-squared 0.08  0.22  0.22 
 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression which also 
includes a constant term. Past unemployment rate and past 
immigration rate are six-quarter lags of the respective variable. 
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses, + significant at 10%; 
































Table 5: 2SLS and JIVE estimates of the effect of Immigration 
Panel A: Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
                    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Total immigrants  Skilled immigrants  Unskilled immigrants 
Net  immigration  rate  1.82  1.9  1.75 -0.49  -2  -1.94 5.14 5.23 4.95 
 (1.00)+  (1.02)+  (1.07) (3.61) (3.98) (3.80)  (1.98)*  (1.62)*  (1.70)* 
Change in 
unemployment  rate    -0.171  -0.062  0.688  0.775  0.593  0.653 
    (1.005)  (1.007)  (0.934)  (0.919)  (0.856)  (0.848) 
Change  in  productivity     -0.453    -0.711    -0.505 
      (0.319)     (0.314)**     (0.311) 
R-squared  0.1  0.09 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 
Panel B: Jackknife Instrumental Variable Estimates (JIVE) 
Net  immigration  rate  1.86  2.15 2.05 -1.3 -2.97  -3.26 5.2 5.28 5.02 
  (1.14)  (1.32) (1.52) (4.13) (4.99) (5.20)  (2.03)**  (1.65)*  (1.74)* 
Change in 
unemployment  rate    -0.258  -0.168  0.787  0.916  0.594  0.654 
    (1.066)  (1.102)  (0.966)  (0.969)  (0.856)  (0.848) 
Change  in  productivity     -0.419    -0.748    -0.503 
      (0.345)     (0.332)**     (0.311) 
Observations  106  106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
R-squared  0.1  0.09 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a separate regression which also includes a constant term.  
Migration rate in a given period is the number of immigrations per one thousand adult (15-64 years of age) Australian 
population for that period. Skilled and unskilled migration rates are the share of each migration category in total migration. 
A large number of immigrants did not reveal their occupation at their country of origin during their first entry into Australia, so 
skilled and unskilled immigration rates do not add up to total migration rate. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses, + 




Notes: Current immigration rate is the number of immigrants per one thousand 
adult (15-64 years of age) Australian population at time t. Past 
immigration rate is the six-quarter lag of the migration rate. 
 
 
Notes: Migration rate in a given period is the number of immigrants per one 
thousand adult (15-64 years of age) Australian population for that 
period.  
Skilled and unskilled migration rates are the shares of each migration 
category in total migration. A large number of immigrants did not 
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Current immigration rate
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics
(Australia: 1980-2006)
Figure 1: Relationship between Past and Current Immigration Rate 40 
 
into Australia, so skilled and unskilled immigration rates do not add up 




Notes:  The growth of weekly wages is the change in the average weekly 
wage between adjacent quarters. The immigration rate is the number 
of all (skilled and unskilled) immigrants per thousand adult (15-64 years 
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Table 1A:  Permanent immigrants entering settlement countries under skilled 
categories (Per cent of all immigrants) 
 
Country 1991  1999  2001  2005 
Australia 37  42  60  65 
Canada 18  47  55   
New Zealand  -  47  68   
United States  18  22  17   
    Source: International Organization for Migration (2005), Productivity 
Commission (2006). 
 















New  Zealand  1.9  1.3  2.7 16.3 9.2 23.7 
UK  and  Ireland  28.2 36.1 41.6 21.5 21.1 10.8 
China*  0.8 0.4 0.2 1.6 2.5 7.4 
South  Africa  0.3 0.4 0.5 3.4  2  6.2 
India  0.7  0.4  2.1 1 2.5 5 
Former 
Yugoslavia 
0.8 6  14.2  2.1  1.6  4.6 
Philippines n.a.  n.a.  0.1  2.5  5  3.5 
Malaysia  0.4  0.2  0.5 2 5.3  1.9 
Viet  Nam  n.a. n.a. n.a.  16  9.2  1.6 
Hong  Kong  + 0.3 0 0.2 1 6.6  1.6 
Germany  34.6 9  2.2 1.5 0.9 0.8 
Netherlands  1.7 8.9 1.5 1.5 0.4 0.5 
Poland  3  1.8 0.3 1.7 1.4 0.2 
Italy  9.3  15.4  5.6 1.3 0.3 0.2 
Austria  3.7 1.9 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Greece  1.1 5.9 5.9 1.1 0.3 0.1 
Other  13.3 12.2 21.9 25.4 31.5 31.7 
Notes: n.a. implies not available 
*     China (excludes SARs and Taiwan Province) 
+     Hong Kong (SAR of China) 












Figure 1A: Immigration by Region of Birth 
 
a Data include settler arrivals as well as permanent residency visas granted 
onshore. Comparability across countries is limited by data collection 
processes, as detailed in appendix B.  
b Data refer to financial years (July to June of the year shown).  
c Data not available before 1994.  
d Data refer to financial years (October to September of the year shown). 





Figure 2A:  Flows of Permanent Immigrants to Australia  
(Percent of total population, 1986-2004)a 
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Changes in unemployment rate Log of changes in wages of all 
Immigration rate Changes in productivity 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006
Australia: 1983-2006
Figure 3A: Trends of Key Variables44 
 
 
Notes for Immigration Data:  
 
Skill characteristics of Permanent immigrants are recorded on Incoming 
Passenger Cards when immigrants land first at Australian airports (or sea 
ports).  
 
There are five different skill levels defined in the Australian Standard 
Classification of Occupations, 2nd edition. They are based on the formal 




1 Manager and Administrators 
2 Professionals 
Most occupations in Major Groups 1 and 2 have a level of skill 
commensurate with a bachelor degree or higher qualification or at least 5 
years relevant experience. In some instances relevant experience is 
required in addition to the formal qualification. 
 
Level 2 
3 Associate Professionals 
Most occupations in Major Group 3 have a level of skill commensurate with 
an Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF) Diploma or Advanced 
Diploma or at least 3 years relevant experience. In some instances relevant 
experience is required in addition to the formal qualification. 
 
Level 3 
4 Tradespersons and Related Workers 
5 Advanced Clerical and Service Workers 
Most occupations in Major Groups 4 and 5 have a level of skill 
commensurate with an AQF Certificate III or IV or at least 3 years relevant 
experience. In some instances relevant experience is required in addition to 
the formal qualification. 
 
Level 4 
6 Intermediate Clerical, Sales and Service Workers 
7 Intermediate Production and Transport Workers 
Most occupations in Major Groups 6 and 7 have a level of skill 
commensurate with an AQF Certificate II or at least one year relevant 
experience. In some instances relevant experience is required in addition to 
the formal qualification. 
 
Level 5 
8 Elementary Clerical, Sales and Service Workers 
9 Labourers and Related Workers 
Most occupations in Major Groups 8 and 9 have a level of skill 
commensurate with completion of compulsory secondary education or an 
AQF Certificate I qualification. 
 45 
 
For the permanent arrivals data, according to ABS, Levels 1, 2 and 3 are 
categorised as "skilled" and Levels 4 and 5 as "unskilled". 